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DISCOVERY DURING TRIAL IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES: THE JENCKS ACT*
by
Lester B. Orfield**
I. DISCOVERY BEFORE THE JENCKS ACT
N FEDERAL criminal cases the defendant may use previous state-
ments made out of court by a government witness that are in-
consistent with his trial testimony to impeach the credibility of the
witness.' It logically follows that all prior statements of a witness
relating to his trial testimony may have possible impeachment value.
In many cases the statements were made to a government agent and
are in the possession of the Government. Is the defendant now en-
titled to production and inspection of the statements at the trial
for use in cross-examination? This Article is addressed to this narrow
question.
Case law pertaining to the production of prior statements made
by government witnesses to government agents is of relatively recent
vintage. Although the earliest decisions held that the defendant could
not compel such production,' the Fourth Circuit, as well as the
Second Circuit' in dictum, refused to follow these decisions in 1932.'
However, during the next two decades the Supreme Court and
several courts of appeals held that the defendant had no absolute
right to production and that production was within the discretion
of the trial court.'
* This Article is dedicated to a leading teacher and writer in the field of evidence,
Professor Roy R. Ray, School of Law, Southern Methodist University. Professor Ray and
I were classmates at the University of Michigan Law School.
** Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B., LL.B., University of Minnesota; M.A.,
Duke University; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Brandeis Research Fellow, Harvard Uni-
versity; member, United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal
Procedure (1941-46); consultant on American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence
(1939-42); author, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal (1947), Criminal Appeals
in America (1939).
' See Orfield, Impeachment and Support of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 11 Kan.
L. Rev. 447, at 447-57 (1963).
a Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1927); Arnstein v. United States,
296 Fed. 946, 950 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 595 (1924). In Arnstein the state-
ment was in the possession of a state prosecutor.
' See United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Nach-
man v. United States, 286 U.S. 556 (1932).
4Asgill v. United States, 60 F.2d 776, 779 (4th Cir. 1932) (letter). The Second Circuit
stated, in dictum, that the defendant might have a right to production under the proper
circumstances. United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom.,
Nachman v. United States, 286 U.S. 556 (1932).
aGoldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942); Simmons v. United States,
220 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Neal v. United States, 203 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 996 (1953); Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d
1964] DISCOVERY: THE JENCKS ACT
The Second Circuit, adhering to its earlier dictum favoring pro-
duction, held that refusal of the defendant's demand at the trial to
inspect a signed statement exonerating the defendant made by a
government witness before the trial was reversible error even though
the witness had admitted on cross-examination that the statement
was entirely false." However, even the Second Circuit limited the
doctrine of production. For example, if the trial court examined the
testimony of a witness taken before a grand jury or written state-
ments made by a witness which were given to the prosecutor and
found that they had no impeaching value, refusal to allow the de-
fendant to examine such matter was not reversible error." Production
was refused if there was no evidence of contradiction! For example,
if a government witness had given a statement in question and answer
form to the Government but did not use such statement to refresh
his recollection while testifying and there was no discrepancy be-
tween the statement and the witness' testimony, the trial judge may
refuse to require delivery of the statement to defendant's counsel
for purposes of cross-examination.9 Furthermore, if the statement
contained merely minor contradictions of unimportant testimony,
the trial court was not reversed in the absence of prejudicial error."
Following the liberal approach taken by the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court was more receptive to production in 1953. In Gordon
338, 375 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952); Kaufman v. United States,
163 F.2d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1948); Boehm v. United
States, 123 F.2d 791, 805 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 800 (1942); Little v.
United States, 93 F.2d 401, 406 (8th Cir. 1937); United States v. Toner, 77 F. Supp. 908,
917 (E.D. Pa. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1949). But see United
States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd on other grounds
sub. nora., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). In Boehm and United States v.
Muraskin, 99 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1938), refusal to order production was treated as
harmless error. See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 354-55 (1945). In Krulewitch v. United States, 145
F.2d 76, 78 (1944), Judge C. E. Clark argued for discretion in the trial court. In 1943
the Supreme Court did not review the denial by the trial court of defendant's motion to
inspect his entire selective service file because the issue was not presented in the petition
for certiorari. Bowles v. United States, 319 U.S. 33, 36 (1943). Mr. Justice Jackson and
Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting, thought such procedure was reversible error. The trial judge
was not required to permit the defendant to examine the notes although counsel stated
that he noticed the Government had an additional set of notes as to the jurors and that
he thought that the Government had made an FBI examination of the jury. Christoffel v.
United States, 171 F.2d 1004, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S.
84 (1949).
6 United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944), noted in 45 Colo. L. Rev.
461 (1945), 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 719, 731 (1950); see also Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 514-19 (1946).
"United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 797(1945); see also United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1944).
United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1951).
:United States v. Simonds, 148 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1945).
1OUnited States v. De Normand, 149 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
756 (1945).
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v. United States1 the Court held that the trial court was bound
under its common-law powers to order, at the request of the de-
fendant, production of a government witness' prior inconsistent
statement in the Government's hands. 2 Production may be required
though inspection may show that the document properly could be
excluded if offered in evidence. The Court stated that the question
of discovery of documents at the trial for impeachment purposes is
one to be decided by the courts in the "absence of specific legisla-
tion."" It was not clear from the decision, however, whether the
Court also adopted the limitations laid down by the Second Circuit.
The first case to apply the holding in Gordon construed the decision
as meaning that the defendant could compel production merely by
making certain that his demand was for specific documents in the
possession of the Government.1' However, later cases held that the
defendant must lay a foundation of inconsistency before production
would be compelled.
Although the authorities were not in agreement, the better view
was that the defendant was not required to make a showing of
inconsistency or contradiction. For example, in the trial of Aaron
Burr, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that it was necessary to aver
only that it "may be material" in order to compel production of a
letter to the President in the hands of the Government."' Other cases
held that contradiction was unnecessary, but either refused a new
trial because an examination by the trial judge disclosed no relevant
material' or denied the motion for production because no specific
material was demanded." A few cases, however, did require a showing
of inconsistency."
If the defendant does not show the materiality of the report
"344 U.S. 414 (1953).
"Id. at 416-17, 421-22. The witness admitted the conflict.
Id. at 418.
14United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345, 350 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
"United States v. Fontana, 231 F.2d 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1956); United States v. Bookie,
229 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Lightfoot. 228 F.2d 861, 868 (7th Cir.
1956); Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382, 385 (lst Cir. 1955); Simmons v. United
States, 220 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 814 (5th
Cir. 1953). But see United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1955), holding
that the trial judge should compel production if he finds anything contradictory in the
prior statement.
"United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 191 (No. 14694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
'7Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791, 807 (8th Cir. 1941).
"United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345, 350 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 223 F.2d
449 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956). For other cases see Note,
67 Yale L.J. 674, 677 n.13 (1958).
1"United States v. Dilliard, 101 F.2d 829, 837 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
635 (1939); United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom.,
Nachman v. United States, 286 U.S. 556 (1932).
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sought, there is no right of discovery at the trial."' Moreover, the
defendant must give a specific description or designation of the state-
ment, document, or report." If the Government elected not to comply
with an order to produce on the ground of privilege, it could not
proceed with the prosecution." However, one decision" suggested
that the witness' testimony should be stricken instead of dismissing
the case.
Initial inspection was usually by the trial court if production was
allowed.'" However, some decisions held that the defendant might
directly inspect the requested statements provided a preliminary
showing of inconsistency was made in order to obtain production.2
Obviously, it was extremely difficult to lay such a foundation with-
out first inspecting the statements. If the witness admitted incon-
sistency, production was allowed.'
The defendant had a right to inspect any notes or memoranda
used to refresh the government witness' recollection while testifying."'
In cases involving government witnesses who admitted using their
notes or memoranda in the government's possession to refresh their
recollection before testifying,"8 the question naturally arose whether
the defendant had the same right. The Supreme Court denied any
such absolute right in the defendant and ruled that such was within
"0United States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Bookie,
229 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1956).
"tUnited States v. Muraskin, 99 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1938); United States v.
Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345, 350 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
"1United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (dictum); United States v.
Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d
76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
For an earlier contrary case see Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946, 950 (D.C. Cir.
1924).
"United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 738 (S.D. Cal. 1952), revsd on
other grounds sub. nom., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
4United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1955); Shelton v. United
States, 205 F.2d 806, 814 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78
(2d Cir. 1944); Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791, 806 (8th Cir. 1941); United
States v. Schneiderman, supra note 23.
" Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382, 385 (Ist Cit. 1955); United States v.
Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Nachman v. United States,
286 U.S. 556 (1932); Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946, 950 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 264 U.S. 595 (1924).
26Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 416 (1953); Burton v. United States, 175
F.2d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 909 (1950); United States v.
Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944); Asgill v. United States, 60 F.2d 776, 778
(4th Cir. 1932).
" Montgomery v. United States, 203 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cit. 1953); Little v. United
States, 93 F.2d 401, 406 (8th Cir. 1937); Morris v. United States, 149 Fed. 123, 126
(5th Cir. 1906). For a long period this was virtually the only discovery allowed. See Note,
67 Yale L.J. 674, 679 n.19 (1958).
2'See Orfield, Examination of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 4 Ariz. L. Rev. 215,
229-33 (1963).
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the discretion of the trial court. 9 Writers have criticized this ap-
proach."
In 1957, the Court laid down a broad rule protecting the de-
fendant's rights to discovery during trial. In Jencks v. United States"'
the practice of producing government documents for the trial judge's
determination of relevancy and materiality without hearing the
defendant was disapproved. Furthermore, the necessity of the de-
fendant laying a preliminary foundation showing inconsistency be-
tween the contents of the reports and the testimony of the govern-
ment agents was obviated."2 The Court discarded the conflict test
which necessitated that the defendant know the content of the
reports. Relevancy and materiality for the purpose of production and
inspection, with a view to use in cross-examination, are established
if the reports are shown to relate to the testimony of a witness. The
right to discovery was made absolute, provided the reports related to
previous statements of the government's witness.
After the Jencks decision a federal district court issued the follow-
ing test as to discovery at the trial: Before the defendant may have
production and inspection of a statement made by a person other than
himself, (1) such other person must have been called as a witness by
the Government; (2) the defendant must have established on cross-
examination that the statement was made by such witness; (3) the
statement must be in the possession of the United States; and (4) the
statement must touch events and activities related in direct examina-
tion." This decision was relied upon substantially when the Jencks
statute was passed."
29Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942). Accord, Tillman v. United
States, 268 F.2d 422, 424 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812, 815
(7th Cir. 1956); Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 375 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952).
3 McCormick, Evidence S 9, at 17 (1954); 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 762, at 111 (3d ed.
1940); Orfield, supra note 28, at 232; Note, 45 Colo. L. Rev. 461, 464 n.22 (1945).
3 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 666 (1957), noted in 71 Harv. L. Rev. 87,
87-88, 112-17 (1957), 18 La. L. Rev. 345 (1958), 56 Mich. L. Rev. 314 (1957), 36
N.C.L. Rev. 210 (1958), 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 78 (1957), 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 147 (1958),
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 110 (1957).
a This was the basis for refusing production and inspection in the court of appeals.
226 F.2d 540, 553 (5th Cir. 1955).
aUnited States v. Anderson, 154 F. Supp. 374, 375 (E.D. Mo. 1957); see also United
States v. Carr, 21 F.R.D. 7, 8 (S.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11,
13 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 343 (1959);
United States v. Brockington, 21 F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D. Va. 1957).
4 United States v. Palermo, 258 F.2d 397, 400 n.6 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 343,
359 (1959). Although the Jencks decision attracted much criticism, one writer has pointed
out that the rule of the case "has been in effect for trials by courts martial since 1921."
Kent, The Jencks Case: The Viewpoint of a Military Lawyer, 45 A.B.A.J. 819 (1959).
The statute or the Jencks decision has been followed in California. People v. Chapman,
52 Cal. App. 2d 95, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also People v. Wolff, 18 Ill.
App. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197, 201 (1960); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.S.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d
[Vol. 18
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II. THE STATUTE'
A. The Purpose
Judge Pickett has stated that the purpose of the statute "was to fix
standards by which statements and reports of a witness in the posses-
sion of the Government shall be made available to a defendant in a
criminal prosecution after the witness has testified.""0 Judge Lumbard
quoted favorably the words of Senator O'Mahoney: "The purpose of
the bill is to protect the files of the Government against unwarranted
disclosure and at the same time to preserve due process of law for
defendants in criminal cases.""
The statute carries out the basic premise of the Jencks decision, viz.,
the Government must produce for the defendant's inspection state-
ments made by government witnesses to government agents that may
aid the defendant in contradicting the direct testimony of the witness.
If the Government is unwilling to produce the statement, the testi-
mony of that witness is lost, whereas under the rule of the Jencks
case the defendant got a new trial if the Government did not pro-
duce. The statute also follows the Jencks decision in providing that
no prior foundation of inconsistency between statement and testimony
need be laid if the statement relates to the testimony. However, the
statute makes important changes in the method by which the de-
fendant is furnished the statement. The statements are to be delivered
for inspection, in camera, by the trial judge. The trial judge will de-
termine if any of the statement relates to the testimony. If so, any
nonpertinent portions will be excised. Furthermore, the statute makes
it clear that the statment need be produced only after the witness has
testified. A definition of "statement" as well as a procedure for
correcting errors by the trial judge on appeal is also provided by the
statute. If the Government elects not to produce privileged docu-
ments, it is reasonably clear that the testimony of the witness will
be stricken or that a mistrial will be declared."8
881, 883 (Ct. App. 1961); State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1, 7 (1958); Taitano v.
Guam, 187 F. Supp. 75, 78 (District Ct. App. 1960) (Guam). Either the statute or the
decision has been rejected in Iowa: State v. Kelly, 91 N.W.2d 562, 563-64 (Iowa 1958);
Missouri: State v. Simon, 375 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Mo. 1964); and, in part, in Indiana:
Anderson v. State, 239 Ind. 372, 156 N.E.2d 384, 385 (1959). See 8 Wigmore, Evidence S
2224 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
" The statute is set out in the appendix at the end of this Article.
' United States v. Palermo, 258 F.2d 397, 398 n.2 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S.
343 (1959).
" United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1959); see 103 Cong. Rec.
16487 (1957).
"SNote, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 110, 114-15 (1957); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 87, 112,




The statute as interpreted by the Court "does not reach any con-
stitutional barrier."3 Being procedural in nature, the Jencks Act
applies to offenses committed prior to enactment."9 When reviewing
a decision of a trial court, a court of appeals will apply the law in
effect at the time of review, and on the granting of a new trial, the
statute also will be applied." However, under the statute the de-
fendant must demand the statement in order to preserve his right
to production. Prior to both the Jencks decision and the statute, only
a few circuits permitted production; hence, there would have been
no occasion for demand in many circuits. In practice, therefore,
instances of retroactive application will be rare.
B. Scope
The statute applies only to discovery in criminal cases." It allows
discovery pursuant to a motion to vacate. ' If the Government refuses
to make such discovery, the proper procedure is for the trial court
to strike from the record all testimony given by the witness sought
to be impeached and proceed with the hearing; no new trial should
be granted to the moving party merely because of the refusal."
Although the statute applies only in criminal cases, there is some
authority that the rule of the Jencks case is applicable in administra-
tive proceedings.'
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the statute is the sole
and exclusive means of obtaining statements of government witnesses.
The Court said: "[S]tatements of a government witness made to an
agent of the government which cannot be produced under the terms
a"Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll (1959). Congress has the power
to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal courts. The Supreme Court may prescribe
rules of procedure and evidence "only in the absence of a relevant act of Congress."
Ibid. In 1961 Mr. Justice Harlan stated: "That the procedure set forth in the statute
does not violate the Constitution and that the procedure required by the decision of this
Court in Jencks was not required by the Constitution was assumed by us in Palermo v.
United States .. " Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 257 (1961). Scales was followed
in Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1963); see Comment, 38 Texas L.
Rev. 595 (1960); Note, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 888 (1960); Note, 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 78
(1957).
"°United States v. Simmons, 281 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.
Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842, 851 (N.D. Tex. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 125, 130 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958); see Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 687 n.48 (1958).
" Lohman v. United States, 251 F.2d 951, 953 (6th Cir. 1958).
" Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 486 (sth Cir. 1962).
4328 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). This is so even though hearing on the motion technically
involves a civil proceeding.
4 United States v. Kelly, 269 F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
(1959).
4 Note, 34 Ind. L.J. 441 (1959); Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 326-32 (1959); Note,
4 Vill. L. Rev. 366 (1959); Note, 68 Yale L.J. 1409 (1959).
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of [the Jenks Act] cannot be produced at all."" However, a more
reasonable approach would seem to be that the statute is the ex-
clusive means of production as of right and that in other cases the
trial judge in his discretion may order production."
The statute does not give a right to discovery of grand jury
minutes. 8 The right to disclosure of grand jury minutes remains as
it was before the statute, 9 viz., Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure governs."
C. Relation To The Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure
Prior to the Jencks case the courts construed Rule 17(c) to mean
that a defendant who was unable to establish definitely that a speci-
fied person would be called as a witness could not obtain discovery
prior to trial."1 Moreover, the defendant could not obtain FBI reports
under Rule 16." It has been held that the rule of the Jencks decision
did not apply to pre-trial procedure because the opinions made no
references to Rules 16 and 17.' s
"Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 351 (1959), noted in 73 Harv. L. Rev.
179 (1959), 21 Md. L. Rev. 153 (1961), 39 Ore. L. Rev. 196 (1960), 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 141 (1959). See criticism in Borillo, Section 3500; Justice on a Tightrope, 45 Marq.
L. Rev. 205, 218-20 (1959).
"'Note, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 141, 145 (1959); Note, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 888, 890-93
(1960); Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 688-89 (1958).
4 Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959), afirming 260
F.2d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1958) (four Justices dissented), noted in 48 Calif. L. Rev. 160
(1960), 27 Fordham L. Rev. 244 (1958), 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 606 (1959), 13 Vand. L.
Rev. 404 (1959); Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894, 902 (5th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Spangelet,
258 F.2d 338, 340 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. West, 170 F. Supp. 200, 209 (N.D.
Ohio 1959); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860, 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). Compare United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957)
which applied the Jencks case to grand jury minutes.
The case was followed in Hance v. United States, 299 F.2d 389, 398 (8th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51, 67 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Killian, 275
F.2d 561, 571 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Kirby, 273 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1959).
41 See note 58 infra.
so Borillo, supra note 46, at 214, 216; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or
Apparent, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 56, 68-71 (1961); see Note, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 482, 493-502
(1960); Note, 38 Texas L. Rev. 595, 605-08 (1960); Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 297,
319-26 (1959); see also Orfield, The Federal Grand jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 402-13, 447-60
(1959).
" United States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286, 287 (N.D. Il1. 1955); United States v.
Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 369 (D.D.C. 1954); see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 132 (1942).
" United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 706 (W.D. La. 1949); United States
v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270, 271 (N.D. Ind. 1946). Furthermore, there were cases which
regarded discovery, in general, as discretionary. See, e.g., United States v. Schiller, 187
F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1951).
"SUnited States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.N.J. 1957); United States v.
Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see also United States v. Carr, 21 F.R.D.
7, 11 (S.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 258 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 343 (1959); United States v. Brocking-
ton, 21 F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D. Va. 1957). But see United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp. 661,
663 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
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The legislative history indicates that the Jencks Act was not in-
tended to affect the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." The
courts generally have denied discovery of statements of witnesses
under Rule 17(c)." Furthermore, the Supreme Court has pointed
out that the discovery provided by Rule 16 is more narrow than
that under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." In the
proposed amendments to Rule 16, which would allow the defendant
discovery as to his own statements, the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Criminal Procedure tacitly recognizes that the Jencks statute did
not affect the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Moreover, the
proposed amendment expressly recognizes that the Jencks statute is
not otherwise affected in providing: "This rule does not authorize
the discovery or inspection of statements or reports made by Gov-
ernment witnesses or prospective government witnesses (other than
the defendant) to agents of the government except as provided in
[the Jenks Act]."5" The Sixth Circuit has held that the Jencks statute
"expressly prohibits pre-trial discovery of such reports."59 In another
instance the Fifth Circuit stated that section 3500(a) "defeats the
appellant's assertion of right to discovery before the trial."" ° More-
over, it has been stated broadly that the statute "does away with any
pre-trial discovery of statements of a government witness."'" The
discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not be
used to circumvent the statute."2 In light of the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that "statements of a government witness made to
an agent of the Government which cannot be produced under the
terms of [the Jencks Act] cannot be produced at all,"" it reasonably
4 Note, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 314, 317 (1957); see also Borillo, supra note 46, at 219
n.88; Keefe, links and Jencks, 7 Catholic U.L. Rev. 91, 100-01, 108-09 (1958); Note,
58 Mich. L. Rev. 888, 893 (1960); Note, 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 78, 81-82 (1957); Note,
11 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 315-19 (1959); Note, 38 Texas L. Rev. 595, 598 n.21 (1960);
Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 690-93 (1958).
"' Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the
Federal Courts, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1113, 1116-17 (1957); Orfield, Subpoena in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 13 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 74-92 (1960); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection
in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. Va. L. Rev. 312, 318-21 (1957).
Compare, however, Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 885 (1953); 4 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2183.1, at 186
(Supp. 1962); Goldstein, The State and the Accused, Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1181-82 (1960); Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 693 (1958).
"Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 419, n.9 (1953); see also Orfield, supra note
55, at 248-57; Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 692 (1958).
'v31 F.R.D. 671, 675 (1963).
88 Ibid.
59
Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 693 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909
(1959).
"°Casados v. United States, 300 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1962), citing 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 179-86 (1959).
"' Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962).
62 Id. at 492 (concurring opinion).
"3Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 351 (1959).
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follows that statements cannot be produced under Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."'
Statements or reports in the possession of the Government that
were made by government witnesses or prospective government
witnesses other than the defendant to an agent of the Government do
not embrace existing records obtained by the Government from third
parties by seizure or process." Hence, the Jencks statute does not bar
the defendant from obtaining such records before trial under Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In general the statements producible under the statute are not
producible before trial. But as has been pointed out:
There may be cases in which the witness is almost certain to testify and
in which adequate preparation for impeachment would because of the
length and complexity of the statement, necessitate serious delay in the
trial if there is no opportunity for pretrial inspection. In this situation,
if other means for discovering the facts are not available it would seem
that some inspection of the statements should be allowed."
Professor Louisell has suggested that in Campbell v. United States,
which went to the Supreme Court twice, the proliferation of collateral
issues might have been avoided by pre-trial discovery." The Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws provided, as an optional pro-
vision, for pre-trial discovery of "written statements of witnesses.""8
However, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States did not move in this
direction; in fact it expressly made Rule 16 subject to the statute."
The Committee may well have felt that there was little likelihood
that a rule reducing the scope of the statute would secure acceptance.
III. STAGE AT WHICH PRODUCTION ALLOWED
Discovery under the statute may not be obtained before trial by
"Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 1963).
65United States v. Fancher, 195 F. Supp. 448, 450-51 (D. Conn. 1961); see Note,
67 Yale L.J. 674, 692 (1958).
"Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1058 (1961); see Symposium-Discovery in Federal
Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 117-18, 121-22 (1963); Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133,
1139-40 (1963). The California Supreme Court has permitted such pre-trial discovery.
Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1959); see Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 56, 79 (1961).
6 Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14
Vand. L. Rev. 921, 930-31 (1961).
" Orfield, supra note 55, at 338-39; see also Note, 60 Yale L.J. 626, 641-42 (1951),
allowing discovery in the court's discretion; Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 695-97 (1958);
Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 315-19 (1959).
e9 3 1 F.R.D. 671, 675 (1963).
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motions for a bill of particulars or for discovery."0 Such motions are
premature. At the trial perhaps a foundation must be laid for the mo-
tion by asking on cross-examination whether the witness has made any
statements or reports to a government agent regarding the subject
matter of his direct testimony. In one case the court stated that the
witness "was not asked whether he had made any statement or re-
port. . . . In other words, there was a complete absence of any evi-
dence which tended to show directly or indirectly that the secret
files of the Government contained any statement or report made by
the witness relating to the matter.""' However, it would seem that
the defendant is entitled to any statement meeting the test of the
statute, i.e., if it touches on the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness.
Subsection (a) manifests the general aim of the statute to restrict
the use of statements of government witnesses to impeachment be-
cause the statement is not to be turned over to the defendant until
the witness has testified on direct examination. " The defendant has
no right to the statement before the witness has testified."2 The state-
ment may be furnished the defendant as the witness is examined or
immediately following his direct examination." There may be a right
to production even though the issue is raised on cross-examination of
the witness rather than on direct examination." A denial of discovery
may be cured by permitting it later, provided that the delay does
not prejudice the defendant in presenting his case to the jury." How-
ever, it is better procedure to defer the cross-examination until the
court has conducted an inquiry. '
"°Odgen v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1962); Casados v. United
States, 300 F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1962); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 693
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909 (1959); Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345,
347 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Bruce, 33 F.R.D. 133, 136 (N.D. Miss. 1963);
United States v. Tane, 29 F.R.D. 131, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Abrams,
29 F.R.D. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 522
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
"'United States v. Kelly, 269 F.2d 448, 452 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
904 (1960).
72Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959); Kilgore v. United States, 323
F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Bruce, 33 F.R.D. 133, 136 (N.D. Miss.
1963); United States v. Willis, 33 F.R.D. 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"3 Roberson v. United States, 282 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir. 1960). If the defendant has
pled guilty and is awaiting sentence, he is not entitled to production of statements or
reports in the possession of an investigating officer of the post office insofar as they were
made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses, other than the defend-
ant, to the officer. United States v. Greathouse, 188 F. Supp. 765, 767 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
A subponea duces tecum for such production will be quashed on motion of the Government.
""Robertson v. United States, 263 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1959).
72United States v. Chapman, 318 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1963).
"'Leach v. United States, 320 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Lohman v. United
States, 266 F.2d 3, 5 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959).
"? Leach v. United States, supra note 76, at 671.
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Discovery under the statute may occur not only at the trial, but
subsequently on a motion to vacate the sentence."8 Under subsection
(b) production is to be "on motion of the defendant." But the de-
mand may be very informal, such as a question by defendant's
counsel, "May I see it?"'" The motion should not be made by a co-
defendant." The defendant's request to inspect documents used by
a government witness to refresh his memory is not a proper demand
under the statute.' If the defendant's counsel knows that a memo-
randum is available to him, but makes no request for it, the de-
fendant cannot complain on appeal that the memorandum was not
turned over to him." Moreover, if the statements are furnished before
trial and the request for them is not renewed at the trial, there is no
error in failing to furnish the statements at the trial. 3 The abandon-
ment of a request for production also precludes raising the issue on
appeal. . In some cases it may be wise not to seek production, 5 and
failure to make a demand for an available statement does not show
incompetence of counsel."
A. Meaning Of "Statement"
The Jencks Act does not extend to statements in the possession of
the Government that were made by the defendant.'" In situations in
which the defendant requests the production of his prior statements,
the discretion of the trial judge controls, thus preserving the rule
which existed before the statute." Moreover, if the statement is not
"SUnited States v. Kelly, 269 F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
904 (1960).
7' United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Kling-
hoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 493 (2d Cir. 1960); Howard v. United States,
278 F.2d 872, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
soBowser v. United States, 318 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (but see opinion of J.
Fahy); United States v. Simmons, 281 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1960).
"I United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 493 (2d Cir. 1960).
" Harrison v. United States, 318 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Odgen v. United States,
303 F.2d 724, 733 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Grabina, 295 F.2d 792, 793 (2d Cir.
1961); United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v.
Farley, 292 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cit. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962); United States
v. Simmons, 281 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1960); Badon v. United States, 269 F.2d 75, 82
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959); Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345,
347 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 449 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 821 (1958).
aRich v. United States, 261 F.2d 536, 537 (4th Cir. 1958).
"United States v. Paroutian, 319 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cit. 1963).
SUnited States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
919 (1961).
" United States v. Rush, 215 F. Supp. 882, 884 (E.D. La. 1963).
'718 U.S.C. § 3500(a); De Freese v. United States, 270 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir.
1959); United States v. David, 168 F. Supp. 269, 271 (N.D. Ohio 1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d
248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959); United States v. Malizia, 154 F. Supp.
511, 514 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
"United States v. Malizia, supra note 87, at 514 n.2.
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made to a government agent, the statute does not apply.s9 The trial
judge does not have to order production of exhibits attached to writ-
ten reports of governmental agents if the exhibits contain statements
of other witnesses. "° Memoranda which might be used as a basis for
cross-examination, although not producible for purposes of impeach-
ment, are not covered by the statute.9 ' Furthermore, a government
witness is not required by statute to produce notes which he had testi-
fied that he made on the case and from which he had read to refresh his
recollection prior to appearance in court.9" Departmental pay records
are not "statements" within the statutea although such records are
often important as evidence of contradiction or bias. The right to
production of the criminal record of a co-conspirator who testifies
for the Government is not guaranteed by the statute. 4 If trial is by
the court upon waiver of a jury and if the defendant requests that
a report of a government agent be produced, the defendant is pre-
cluded from obtaining a mistrial because the report contains a record
of prior convictions."
The Supreme Court has stated that the statute does not provide
that inconsistency between the statement and the witness' testimony
is to be a relevant consideration or that the statement be admissible
as evidence. " Under subsection (b) only statements which relate
to the subject matter about which the witness has testified need be
produced."9 A clear example of a situation in which the statute re-
"aUnited States v. Neverline, 266 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v.
Garrison, 168 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
"aUnited State, v. Franklin, 170 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
"' Tillman v. United States, 268 F.2d 422, 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1959).
"McGill v. United States, 270 F.2d 329, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1959); see Orfield, supra
note 28, at 232.
"Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d
314 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dictum). The court considered them to be "records of an executive
department maintained in the course of carrying out its functions." Id. at 330. Prior to the
statute, production of such records was granted. Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99, 104
(9th Cir. 1956). The statute does not apply to miscellaneous photographs. Ahlstedt v.
United States, 325 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1963). In a prosecution for rape on a vessel on
the high seas, the defendant was given discovery of memoranda which were part of the
ship's log before trial. "Any such entries, reports, statements or memoranda were made
and kept in the usual and regular course of business in the operation of the vessel, and
do not come within the definition of 'statement' under the Jencks Act." United States v.
Willis, 33 F.R.D. 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
'
4 Feyrer v. United States, 314 F.2d 110, 113 (9th Cir. 1963).
"'United States v. Cimino, 321 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1963).
"Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.10 (1959).
"T See appendix at the end of this Article.
"Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 370 (1959); United States v. Bernard,
287 F.2d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 1961). A letter written by the victim to an United States
attorney, signed by her, and stating that her memory was poor as to the matters that
she testified should be produced. Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 370 (1959)
(four justices dissenting). However, the error is harmless if the same information was
revealed by the victim to the defendant's counsel under cross-examination and questioning
by the trial judge.
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quires production occurred in a case in which the witness gave the
Government a statement prior to the trial denying any knowledge
of a robbery. However, at the trial the witness testified in detail as
to the plans for the robbery, as to her accompanying the defendant
and another to the vicinity of the bank, and as to her seeing them
come out of the bank with the money.
A statement in the form of a written memorandum pursuant
to subsection (e) (1)' need not be made contemporaneously with
the conversations and interviews reported therein.1 ' The requirement
that the statement be contemporaneous applies only to "a substan-
tially verbatim recital of an oral statement" made to a government
agent under subsection (e) (2)."' A report by an FBI agent prepared
from notes taken by two agents in an interview with the defendant
five days after a bank robbery which was checked by the other agent
who was a witness is a written statement signed or otherwise adopted
by the witness within the statute.' °a Refusal to permit defense counsel
to examine the report is reversible error if it affirmatively appears
that the report could have been used advantageously by the de-
fendant.'" In 1963 the Supreme Court held that an interview report
compiled by a federal agent from the agent's notes, which were in
turn made during an oral interview of the government witness to
whom the agent recited the substance of the account using his notes,
was producible under the statute.' Applying subsection (e) (1), the
Court held that a written statement to be producible need not be
signed by the witness, written by him, or be a substantially verbatim
recording of a prior oral statement. Adoption of an oral presentation
of a written statement is a permissible mode of adopting the written
statement. "As a copy ... the report [was] admissible as independent
evidence for impeachment purposes and not merely as secondary
evidence of the notes which have been destroyed."' '
The statutory provision in subsection (e) (2) defines statement
"as a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or 'other' recording"; the
word "other" refers "to other manual, as well as other mechanical or
99 United States v. Tomaiolo, 286 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1961).
1'18 U.S.C. § 3500(3) (1) (1957). See appendix at the end of the Article.I" Clancy v. United States, 365 U.S. 312, 314 (1961); see also United States v. Bernard,
287 F.2d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 1961); Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1142-44 (1963) (on
subsection (e) (1)).
112 Clancy v. United States, supra note 101, at 314.
103 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1) (1957). See appendix at the end of the Article. United
States v. McCarthy, 301 F.2d 796, 797-98 (3d Cir. 1962).
104id. at 799.
'o' Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963), reversing 303 F.2d 747 (1st Cir.
1962) (Mr. Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart dissented).
'0"Id. at 495 n.11.
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electrical recordings. 1.. In Papworth v. United States the Second
Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to relevant portions of
the original notebook in which an FBI agent recorded substantially
verbatim statements made by a government witness at the time of
an interview with the witness and to an exact typed copy thereof."' 8
However, he was not entitled to a report, which included a running
summary of the investigation in the language of the agent, made two
weeks after the interview by the FBI agents. The latter report was
not a "substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement . . . re-
corded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement"
as required by the statute, nor was it a "report . . . orally made, as
recorded by the F.B.I." under the Jencks decision.'
Although the transcription of a pre-trial statement of a witness
is not a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved
by the witness under subsection (e) (1), it may be a recording or
a transcription which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement made by the witness to an agent of the Government and
contemporaneously recorded under subsection (e) (2)."' In deter-
mining whether a document is "substantially verbatim," the court
should consider the extent to which it conforms to the language of
the interview" as well as the length of the document in comparison
to the length of the interview."'
Pursuant to subsection (e) (2) the interview must be "contemp-
oraneously recorded"; however, this does not mean simultaneous
recordation."' A summary report of an interview with a witness made
ten or fifteen days thereafter is not a "statement."" However, if
contemporaneously recorded, the document is a "statement" even
though transcribed at a later time."' The statement should embrace
the witness' own words; otherwise, it need not be produced."' The
" United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D.N.J. 1958); see Note, 38
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1144-46 (1963) (on subparagraph (e)(2)). As to wiretapping and
the Jencks statute, see 51 J. Crim. L. 441, 447 (1960).
' Papworth v. United States, 256 F.2d 125, 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
854 (1958), affirming 156 F. Supp. 842, 848 (N.D. Tex. 1957); see also Clancy v. United
States, 276 F.2d 617, 634 (7th Cir. 1960).
109 Papworth v. United States, supra note 108, at 130.
11 United States v. Tomaiolo, 280 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1960).
"' United States v. Thomas, 282 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.
Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 273 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp.
747, 749 (D.N.J. 1958); see Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1145-46 (1963).
11Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 355 n.12 (1959).
113 United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1959); see Note, 38 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1133, 1145 (1963).
"
4 Borges v. United States, 270 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
1"United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D.N.J. 1958).
'Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350 (1959), affirming 258 F.2d 397 (2d
Cir. 1958). Four Justices concurred only in the result. Use of the statement was sought
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statute is silent as to nonverbatim, noncontemporaneous records of
oral statements, and they need not be produced. A 600 word
memorandum summarizing parts of a three and one-half hour
interrogation of a witness by a government agent is not required
to be produced by the statute."' Moreover, reports of FBI investiga-
tors neither signed nor otherwise adopted by any witness at the trial
are not "statements" producible under the statute."' Since the passage
of the statute, there is some evidence that agents destroy the original
notes and rely primarily on subsequent summaries and memoranda." '
Judge Charles E. Clark referred to three doctrinal devices em-
ployed to prevent scrupulous application of the statute:1. (1) it is
only harmless error not to produce a statement that appears to
corroborate a witness' testimony;. (2) there is no right to state-
ments relating to purely incidental or collateral aspects of a wit-
ness' testimony;... and (3) there is no right to statements not
sufficiently exact, even though the trial court regards them as prob-
ably verbatim recitals of the witness' oral testimony."' Conceding
that the exceptions "are sufficiently entrenced," he concluded that
"correction must come from the Supreme Court..".
One writer has queried: "Will statements which would be of value
to the defense in impeachment by showing bias; bad character for
veracity; or lack of capacity to observe, recount, or remember be
immune from discovery if they do not relate to the subject matter of
for purposes of cross-examining the informer, not the agent. But if the purpose is to
cross-examine the agent, discovery should be given. Holmes v. United States, 271 F.2d 635,
638 (4th Cir. 1959).
1' Palermo v. United States, supra note 116, at 355.
"' Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 369 (1959). The report of a committee
of the House of Representatives is not producible if the report is an unsigned summary of
evidence drawn from a variety of sources and only some of the evidence was attributed to
the witness who testified. Harney v. United States, 306 F.2d 523, 532 (1st Cir. 1962);
see Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1135 (1963). There is no right to production of reports
or memoranda that contain merely the impressions or conclusions of agents of the Govern-
ment or agents of the SEC. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1959); Ogden
v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Yetman, 196 F.
Supp. 473, 475 (D. Conn. 1961); United States v. Yetman, 196 F. Supp. 569, 570 (D.
Conn. 1961).
... Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 865, 875 (1961); Louisell, The Theory
of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 921, 928-29
(1961); Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 179, 181 n.575 (1961).
... United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 617 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822
(1963).
' United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
919 (1961).
".. United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822
(1963); United States v. Simmons, 281 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1960).
123 United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186, 189 (2d Cir.), vacated sub. norn., Evola v.
United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963).
1




the witness' testimony, even though they otherwise conform to the
statutory definition of 'statement'. . . .""' There has been no clear
answer from the Supreme Court. The Court has held that a state-
ment by a witness expressing fear that her memory of the events in
issue was dimmed related to "the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified.""' The statement would assist impeachment by
showing want of capacity to remember. However, the statement
referred specifically to the events to which the witness testified al-
though it did not deal with the substance of the events. In some
cases it appears that the trial court, out of excessive fairness to the
defendant, has permitted the defendant to see statements to which
he is not entitled by the statute.12 ' It is certainly arguable that the
defendant should have access to documents with impeachment value.
Furthermore, due process of law under the fifth amendment may
make this an element of a fair trial."' It may also be argued that
there is a violation of the sixth amendment provisions in that the
defendant has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him"1'' and "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor."''
The Government must have possession of the statement before the
court may order production.' On principle it would seem that if
the statements are in the possession of a United States attorney in
another district, they should be made available to the defendant."'
However, it has been held otherwise."' The statute imposes no
affirmative duties on an FBI agent to take notes while interviewing
witnesses."' Although the better practice is to preserve written notes,
good faith destruction of notes in the Government's possession is
not the equivalent of noncompliance with the order to produce."
"sComment, 38 Texas L. Rev. 595, 602 (1960); see also Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674,
693-95 (1958).
.2. Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 370 (1959).
"1 United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 940 (2d Cir. 1963); see Ogden v. United
States, 303 F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1962); Symposium-Discovery in Federal Criminal
Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 121-22 (1963).
12 Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to the Accused, 34 F.R.D. 87 (1964);
Comment, 38 Texas L. Rev. 595, 608-11 (1960).
19 Orfield, Depositions in Federal Criminal Evidence, 9 S.C.L.Q. 376, 392-98 (1957).
"' Orfield, Subpoena in Federal Criminal Procedure, supra note 55, at 10-28 (1960);
Comment, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 888, 893-98 (1960); Comment, 38 Texas L. Rev. 595, 609
(1960); Note, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 141, 147 (1959). Compare Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84,
183 (1959).
... De Freese v. United States, 270 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1959).
112 Borillo, supra note 46, at 213-14.
3"United States v. West, 170 F. Supp. 200, 209 (E.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d
885 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 811 (1961).
"34Campbell v. United States, 296 F.2d 527, 531 (1st Cir. 1961).
3' United States v. Aviles, 197 F. Supp. 536, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 315 F.2d
186 (2d Cir.), vacated sub. nom., Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963).
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It is not clear whether there is a duty to preserve records."'6 Although
the Supreme Court initially appeared to have left the question un-
answered,"a' later cases indicate that destruction of notes in accordance
with normal administrative practice is not reversible error if the
same information is made available to the defendant in a signed state-
ment or interview report.
The Second Circuit has stated: "The legislative history strongly
indicates that one evil Congress sought to remedy in passing the
Jencks Act was the possible production of notes made by govern-
ment attorneys in preparing their case." '139 However, the same court
has pointed out that Hickman v. Taylor' "was concerned solely with
discovery in civil proceedings" '' and also that the statute "makes no
distinction among statements on the basis of the purpose for which
they are recorded or the type of government agents to whom they
were made."'". In United States v. Aviles" notes of an United States
attorney taken from conversations with the Government's principal
witness during the investigative stage of the case were producible
under the statute because they were substantially verbatim, recorded
contemporaneously, and relevant to the direct testimony of the
witness.'"
Reports made by government agents may be encompassed by the
'SoUnited States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820
(1962).
""Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 98 (1961). Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a
separate opinion denied any duty. Id. at 102.
.aS Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S.
231, 242 (1961); Ogden v. United States, 323 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Tomaiolo, 317 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d
186, 188 (2d Cir.), vacated sub. nom., Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963); United
States v. Thomas, 282 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1960). The trial court need not strike the
testimony of a witness because of the inability of the Government to produce, on de-
fendant's motion, notes taken by an FBI agent while interviewing the witness if the notes
had been previously destroyed without intent to suppress evidence and defendant's counsel
was given a typewritten report that accurately reflected the story of the witness as out-
lined in the notes. United States v. Thomas, supra at 194; see also United States v. Tomaiolo,
supra; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1140-41 (1963).
On how much testimony of the witness may be stricken see United States v. Kelly, 269
F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1959); Great Lakes Airlines, Inc.
v. CAB, 291 F.2d 354, 365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961); Note, 38
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1140-41 (1963).
agUnited States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 951 (2d Cir. 1961).
'"Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
141United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir.), vacated sub. norm., Evola v.
United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963); see also Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346, 349
(D.C. Cir. 1963), noted in 13 Am. U.L. Rev. 89 (1963).
14 United States v. Aviles, supra note 141.
143200 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 315 F.2d 186 (2d Cir.), vacated sub. noras.,
Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963).
14United States v. Aviles, supra note 143, at 715.
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statute. 14" Furthermore, the report of one agent to another covering
an interview with the defendant may constitute a statement pursuant
to the statute.'' In an income tax prosecution in which the Govern-
ment relied on the net worth method and based its testimony on
agents' investigatory results, the defendant was entitled to produc-
tion of the agents' reports relating to the defendant's assets, income,
and expenditures during the entire tax period."' Although the
statute "was intended to proscribe production of investigative reports
as such . . . the government has chosen to base its case on the testi-
mony of the agents as to the results of their investigations."'48 (Em-
phasis added.)
IV. DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT
"The producibility of statements under the Jencks Act and their
admissibility under the rules of evidence are separate questions . . .
but obviously closely related.' 141 It is the function of the trial judge
to determine whether a statement or document must be produced
under the statute.1"' If the defendant seeks production:
The district court has an affirmative duty to determine whether any
such statement exists and is in the possession of the Government and,
if so, to order the production of the statement. Because the defendant
often does not and cannot know whether any such statement exists,
the court must conduct any inquiry which is necessary to aid the judge
to discharge the responsibility laid upon him to enforce the statute.
... Such an inquiry may involve the interrogation of the witness or of
the government agent, or an in camera examination of what is pur-
ported to be a statement under the statute."'
141 United States v. Sheer, 278 F.2d 65, 67 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Berry,
277 F.2d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. O'Conner, 273 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir.
1959) (revenue agent); Holmes v. United States, 271 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1959) (FBI
agent); United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1959) (narcotics bureau agent);
see Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1134-35 (1963).
'"Karp v. United States, 277 F.2d 843, 848 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 842
(1960).
147 United States v. O'Conner, 273 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
14' Id. at 360; see also Burke v. United States, 279 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1960); Jacobs
v. United States, 279 F.2d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1960).
4'Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 n.7 (1963).
... United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 138 (7th Cir. 1962); Bary v. United
States, 292 F.2d 53, 58 (10th Cir. 1961); see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
258 (1961); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 361 (1959). Even though numerous
documents may be involved, the Government may not make the determination. United
States v. Accardo, supra, and Bary v. United States, supra. There is no right to a jury trial
in order to determine whether statements are producible under the statute. The hearing
is considered only a procedural step. Ogden v. United States, 323 F.2d 818, 821 (9th
Cir. 1963).
.. Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see also Williams
v. United States, 328 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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In Campbell v. United States"'. the defendants attempted to obtain
production of an interview report which had been prepared by a
government agent subsequent to an interview with the government
witness."' The defendants contended that the report was a state-
ment by the government witness. The trial judge conducted an
inquiry outside the presence of the jury in order to hear testimony
and counsel's argument on the motion.'14 To the defendants' sug-
gestion that the government agent who had prepared the report be
called,"' the trial judge ruled that the defendants should subpoena
the agent as their witness "if they believed his testimony would sup-
port their motions, and that he would not of his own motion sum-
mon [the agent] to testify, or require the Government to produce
him."'.. The Court remanded the motion for redetermination be-
cause the agent's testimony might have indicated that the interview
report was a statement pursuant to the statute;" ' moreover, the de-
fendant's cross-examination of the government witness established
a prima facie case of the right to examine the statement."' The de-
fendants did not have the burden of proving facts peculiarly within
the government's knowledge."' Requiring the defendant to call the
government agent as his own witness would necessarily limit the
examination and possibly preclude the defendant from challenging
any of the agent's answers. Furthermore, the trial judge relied upon
the testimony of the government witness that was based upon his
inspection of the interview report in order to determine whether the
report was a substantially verbatim recital of what he had told the
agent during the oral interview."' This also was error because the
examination of the witness necessitated showing him the report, thus
destroying or seriously undermining the value of the report for
impeachment purposes."'
It is proper to use extrinsic evidence to determine the existence of
unproduced statements taken by the FBI from the witness."' Thus,
the agent in charge of the investigation may be called. If there is
serious question whether a record is a substantially verbatim report,
12 Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961) (four justices dissented in part




15 Id. at 94.
'5Id. at 95.
15Id. at 98.
'58 Id. at 96.
159 Ibid.
"e0 Id. at 96-97.
1e' Id. at 97.
"'United States v. Chrisos, 291 F.2d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 1961).
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the trial judge should conduct a voir dire examination of the gov-
ernment agents."' 3 "A hearing to receive extrinsic evidence may be
required to determine: Whether a particular paper is a 'statement'...
whether (where the record is not clear) statements exist in addition
to those produced by the government . . . whether a statement once
in existence is still in the possession of the government or has been
destroyed."'"
The duty of excising unrelated parts of the statement rests on the
trial judge. " ' Although he cannot relinquish such duty to govern-
ment agents, the trial judge is entitled to the assistance of the Gov-
ernment in directing the court's attention to portions of the FBI
reports it believes unrelated."'0 However, such portions should be
considered by the court in their context. The relevant portions of
the report should be delivered to the defendant without impairing
the continuity. The provisions in subsection (c) for examination by
the court in camera and the excision by the court of unrelated
matter do not violate due process of law."0 7 The entire text is pre-
served for appellate review although, in practice, a photostated copy
of the original statement less the excised portions is delivered to the
defendant.
If the trial court declares a mistrial after willful refusal by the
Government to produce a statement to which the defendant is en-
titled by the statute, it is arguable that in a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense that the defendant may assert double jeopardy.'
The statute does not provide for dismissal of the indictment as a
method of enforcement,"' nor does it provide for contempt pro-
ceedings against the government agent who refuses production of
the statement.' A motion to vacate will not be successful because
discovery was not allowed under the statute.' Objection to the
ruling should be taken by appeal from the conviction. Futhermore,
s.a United States v. Tomaiolo, 280 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.
McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1959).
104 Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 736 n.41 (9th Cir. 1962).
o' United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 141 (7th Cir. 1962); Bary v. United States,
292 F.2d 53, 58 (10th Cir. 1961); Holmes v. United States, 271 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir.
1959).
' Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1960).
107 West v. United States, 274 F.2d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 1960); Travis v. United States,
269 F.2d 928, 944 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Davis, 262 F.2d 871, 873 (7th
Cir. 1959); Sells v. United States, 262 F.2d 815, 823 (10th Cir. 1958).
1.. See Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1141-42 (1963); Comment, 38 Texas L. Rev.
595, 611-12 (1960).
"'5 Dismissal was a possibility under the Jencks decision. 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957). On
enforcement of discovery orders, see Note, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 697-99 (1958).
.. In a case decided prior to the enactment of the statute, the trial court permitted
such a proceeding. United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp. 661, 664-65 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
... United States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Gandia,
255 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1958).
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a motion to vacate will not succeed if the record does not show that
the statements existed or that there was any demand for such state-
ments at the trial."2
V. HARMLESS ERROR
Failure to produce a statement often has been held to be a sub-
stantial and prejudicial error.' However, the Eighth Circuit asserted
that this was not necessarily true in all instances.' The Supreme
Court accepted the latter approach in 1961 .'7 Thus, an appellate
court may remand a case to determine whether prejudicial error has
been committed. In general there is no prejudicial error if the in-
formation withheld is otherwise in the possession of the defendant.
7
1
If it affirmatively appears that the report could have been used
advantageously by the defendant, refusal to produce is reversible
error.' It seems proper to conclude as one writer has done: "The
application of the harmless error rule must necessarily depend upon
a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case.'
7
VI. CONCLUSION
There have been approximately 150 decisions construing the
Jencks statute. Mr. Justice Clark recently has pointed out, "The
..2 United States v. Rush, 215 F. Supp. 882, 884 (E.D. La. 1963).
73 United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 615 (1963); United States v. Sheer, 278
F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1960); Holmes v. United States, 271 F.2d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1959);
Bradford v. United States, 271 F.2d 58, 67 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Prince, 264
F.2d 850, 852 (3d Cir. 1959); Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir.
1958); Bergman v. United States, 253 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1958); Lohman v. United
States, 251 F.2d 951, 953 (6th Cir. 1958).
14 Karp v. United States, 277 F.2d 843, 849 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 84
(1960). The court relied on Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 367 (1959).
... Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 243 (1961); see also Leach v. United States,
320 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 473 (2d
Cir. 1963); Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hance v.
United States, 299 F.2d 389, 397 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Annuziato, 293 F.2d
373, 381 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961); United States v. LaRocca, 219 F.
Supp. 53, 58 (W.D. Md. 1963).
... It was harmless error for the Government to withhold a typewritten copy of a state-
ment, the original of which was in the possession of the defendant's counsel. Rosenberg v.
United States, 360 U.S. 367, 370 (1959). Moreover, the government witness had testified
as to the contents of the statement. Ibid. If grand jury minutes containing the same state-
ments as another statement are produced, it is not reversible error not to produce the other
statement. United States v. Aviles, 200 F. Supp. 711, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 315
F.2d 186 (2d Cir.), vacated sub. nom., Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963). If
the Government supplied the documents to the defendant before the trial, it is not re-
versible error in refusing to allow discovery at the trial. Anderson v. United States, 262
F.2d 764, 771 (8th Cir. 1959). This is true even though the defendant requests discovery
during the trial.
... Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 497 n.14 (1963); Clancy v. United States,
365 U.S. 312, 316 (1961); United States v. McCarthy, 301 F.2d 796, 799 (3d Cir. 1962);
see Comment, 38 Texas L. Rev. 595, 604-05 (1960); Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 183 (1959).
'
78 Borillo, supra note 46, at 217; see also Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1137-38 (1963).
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delineation of the limits of the Jencks Act has been peculiarly the
province of this Court..... Rights acquired as a result of the Jencks
decision will be lost if the courts pursue a policy of strict statutory
construction. Although the statute appears to limit pre-trial dis-
covery, such discovery would be expeditious in some instances. How-
ever, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure has
rejected liberalization of the pre-trial discovery rules. Further study
by the Committee and Congress on the interrelation of the statute
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure seems desirable. In-
spection of unauthenticated statements after a witness has testified
is inhibited by decisions which hold that trial discovery is governed
exclusively by the statute. The trial court should have discretion to
allow discovery in such cases. Furthermore, if statements evidencing
bias or a propensity to lie are not producible, statutory amendments
are needed. It seems unfortunate that courts have not applied the
statute to grand jury minutes. Moreover, the Advisory Committee
has not proposed an amendment to Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to permit such discovery.
Finally, the doctrine of harmless error should be applied with great
caution. Statutory discovery during the trial was intended to give
the defendant an absolute right to discovery, whereas the pre-trial
discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has
often been referred to as discretionary in character. "[O]nly the de-
fense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use for the
purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby fur-
thering the accused's defense." ' Dean Wigmore has stated the
principle that should govern:
[A] sense of fairness, emphatically expressed in legislation a century
old, has conceded to the accused the power to obtain discovery before
trial of the prosecution's list of witnesses and even documents . . .
and this is in effect a repudiation of that much of a privilege. So why
should there remain a privilege to withhold at the trial when the danger
or fabrication of false counter-evidence has passed?
It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness,
and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold
from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or
chattels relevant to the case unless they are otherwise privileged.181
APPENDIX
§ 3 500. Demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses.
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
"'Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963).1S°Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957).
18 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2224, at 207-09 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
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statement or report in the possession of the United States which was
made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness
(other than the defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be
the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has
testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the
United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the
witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the sub-
ject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents
of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the de-
fendant for his examination and use.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be pro-
duced under this section contains matter which does not relate to the
subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order
the United States to deliver such statement for the inspection of the
court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions
of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the
testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the court shall
then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use.
If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is with-
held from the defendant and the defendant objects to such withhold-
ing, and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the
defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the
United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made
available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the
correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is
delivered to a defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its dis-
cretion, upon application of said defendant, may recess proceedings in
the trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required
for the examination of such statement by said defendant and his prepa-
ration for its use in the trial.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the
court under paragraph (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant
any such statement, or such portion thereof as the court may direct,
the court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness,
and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion shall de-
termine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
(e) The term 'statement,' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d)
of this section in relation to any witness called by the United States,
means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or other-
wise adopted or approved by him; or
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of
an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Govern-
ment and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral
statement.
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